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Abstract In 1965, the Commons Registration Act came into force in England and Wales.
The Act led to the removal of the capacity of commoners to regulate the intensity of grazing
via traditional legal means. From this policy shock a number of voluntary commons asso-
ciations were formed. These voluntary groups relied on their members to agree upon how
the commons should be managed. Using two-stage least squares regression analysis we find
that commons governed by these associations are much more likely to produce sustainable
grazing outcomes. These results are robust to the existence of a variety of controls, includ-
ing overlapping institutional frameworks. Importantly, they highlight the ability of voluntary
environmental organisations to deliver sustainable environmental outcomes.
Keywords Commons · Environmental governance · Voluntary agreements · Non-state
institutions
1 Introduction
Some of England’s most ecologically valuable natural environments are situated within com-
mon lands. While various waves of enclosure has reduced their extent, up until relatively
recently, those that did remain were regulated by a set of stable institutions with ancient
origins; with rights and duties falling on owners and rights holders and enforced through
common law and the manorial court system. The rights system governing the commons had
multiple aims, including economic output, equitable access, and community harmony and
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environmental sustainability (see Rodgers 2010; Winchester and Straughton 2010; Rodgers
et al. 2011; Hodge 2016).
However, in 1965 the commons of England and Wales suffered a policy shock in the form
of the Commons Registration Act 1965 that led to circumstances similar to Hardin’s (1968)
classic allegory of the Tragedy of the Commons. Specifically, it led to a situation where the
sum of individual grazing rights were often far in excess of the carrying capacity of the
common land, but there was no formal legal mechanism to restrict access to rights holders.
In addition, some areas of land were no longer grazed due to difficulties in building and
maintaining infrastructure such as fencing and cattle grids, leading to biodiversity loss and
weed infestation (Natural England 2009a).
Within the institutional vacuum generated by the Commons Registration Act 1965, a
number of commons associations were formed, often from the remnants of the pre-existing
manorial institutions.1 These voluntary groups were set up by commons rights holders them-
selves. They had no state authority and relied on their members to agree upon how the
common should be managed. Only with unanimous agreement were they able to enter into
legally binding agreements or guarantees (Defra 2017).
The policy shock generated by the Commons Registration Act 1965 provides an opportu-
nity to test whether the voluntary commons associations that were formed in its wake were
able to deliver sustainable grazing outcomes. We consider the results to be important to both
the literature evaluating the effectiveness of voluntary associations and agreements to deliver
improved environmental outcomes and to the commons literature.
Starting with the empirical and experimental literature on voluntary associations and
agreements, results concerning their effectiveness in delivering improved environmental
organisations appear inconclusive (Kotchen 2013; Schleich et al. 2016; Gallier et al. 2017;
Kesternich et al. 2017). This is partly driven by the fact that many voluntary environmental
organisations have multiple objectives. For instance, as noted by Baland and Platteau (1998)
and Tachibana and Adhikari (2009), community values such as identity may be placed above
sustainable resource management goals.2 Indeed, while collective action is often necessary, it
is not sufficient in itself for generating sustainable environmental outcomes. Another reason
for the mixed results relates to significant empirical challenges, including the need to obtain
accurate data on environmental performance and to address issues associated with selection
1 See Bailey (2010) and Rodgers et al. (2011) for insights into the functioning of manorial courts, local custom,
and other institutions predating the Commons Registration Act 1965. Manor courts were local meetings, called
by the lord of the manor and presided over by his steward. Those holding land were required to attend and
decisions were taken by a jury that comprised of tenants of the manor. Deliberations were grounded in the
concept of ‘the custom of the manor’, which varied from place to place and normally governed tenure, transfers
of land, and litigations between rights holders. Many manorial courts were already non-functional by the late
nineteenth century, however local custom often continued in various forms. For example, in some cases,
parish councils assumed responsibility for commons within their boundaries. In other cases, land owners and
commoners established governance mechanisms, such as stintholder management committees. Rodgers et al.
(2011: 20) note that ‘[l]ocal custom continued to interact with formal law until the capture of property rights
in a fixed and static form as a result of the Commons Registration Act 1965.’ They also note that voluntary
commons associations proliferated in the late twentieth century in response to the Commons Registration Act
1965 and to coordinate involvement in agri-environmental schemes.
2 For instance, some organisations may be primarily symbolic, more focused on building identity or cementing
a link with the natural resource in question, rather than natural resource management itself.
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bias that are likely to loom large in the formation of voluntary environmental associations
(Rustagi et al. 2010; Kotchen 2013).3
Currently, much of commons literature employs case-study methodology (Poteete and
Ostrom 2008). While the case-study method is undoubtedly rich in its insights and allows for
the nuances of place- and time-specific processes to be uncovered, the data derived from case
studies are not always suitable for hypothesis testing and are limited in their external validity
(van Laerhoven 2010). Larger N-studies that allow for quantitative analysis are therefore
highlighted as a means to complement the insights from case-studies and contribute to the
commons literature (e.g. van Laerhoven 2010; Coleman 2011).
The second reason why these results are important is that they can help to shed light on
the role of the state in relation to the formation and effectiveness of voluntary environmental
organisations. Some, such as Mansbridge (2014), argue that the state is necessary to promote
voluntary group formation and enable them to continue to be effective.4 In terms of its
necessity for enabling the formation of voluntary groups, Mansbridge (2014) argues that the
state is needed to threaten to impose a governance solution if local parties cannot agree to
come together—analogous to the ‘bargaining in the shadow of the law’ literature that sees
parties voluntary agree on an outcome in the knowledge that a decision will be made for
them if they do not (Mnookin and Kornhauser 1979). In terms of the voluntary association’s
continued effectiveness, Mansbridge (2014) argues that recourse to an external sanctioning
authority is necessary as purely local sanctions will be insufficient to protect natural resources.
This contrasts with some of the empirical literature that has shown that local groups who
did not receive state support had improved environmental outcomes. For instance, Tachibana
and Adhikari (2009) found that community based management groups in Nepal who did
not receive official support had better natural resource management outcomes than those
who did. Ito (2012) has also found similar results for community irrigation organizations in
rural China. We also hope that our results add to the emerging field experimental literature
on common pool resource management that primarily aims to investigate the crowding out
effects of centralised interventions (see Vollan 2008; Velez et al. 2010; Lopez et al. 2012;
Santis and Chávez 2015).
The remainder of this paper is as follows. In Sect. 2, we provide an outline of the institu-
tional framework of the commons of England, including a brief account of how the commons
associations function. In Sect. 3 we present our data and empirical methods. In Sect. 4 we
present our results and in Sect. 5 we conduct a number of robustness checks. In Sect. 6 we
discuss the importance of our results, both in terms of the literature and policy implications,
which is then followed by a brief conclusion.
3 This is illustrated by the work of Rustagi et al. (2010), who by combining experimental data with envi-
ronmental outcomes in Ethiopia, found that groups with larger shares of conditional cooperators have better
forest management outcomes. This finding suggests that there are likely to be unobservable characteristics
associated with voluntary group formation and environmental outcomes.
4 While it is well known that Ostrom (1990) and the vast literature that she generated have documented
numerous examples of how natural resource users at the local level can successfully overcome collective action
problems, there remains debate over the degree that the state is needed to enable these outcomes. Mansbridge
(2014) contends that Ostrom’s central concept of polycentrism requires the state as an enabler to assist with
the formation of the local group and the upholding of its rules. In particular, she contends that ‘Ostrom’s
polycentric model assumes that some higher level than the local, which can threaten to impose other solutions,
provide neutral information, provide venues and support for the local negotiation, and, crucially, sanction
non-compliance.’ There are good reasons to take this view as Ostrom (1990, 2009) herself highlights the
necessity of punishing rule violators in her design principles for effective common governance. Furthermore,
in such situations, important decisions would seem to require consensus, including the formation of the group
itself, as there is little or no ability to enforce a majority decision on dissenters; they simply choose to walk
away or to not abide with decisions (Larcom 2016).
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Fig. 1 Common land in England
2 Institutional Environment
In England, commons are privately owned parcels of land where third parties also have
legally recognised use rights. They currently make up approximately 3% of total land area,
and while they are scattered across the country; there are large concentrations in the northwest,
southwest and southeast (see Fig. 1). Up until the Commons Registration Act 1965, commons
were underpinned by a system of property rights where the lord of the manor owned the land
and the local community (including farmers) held use rights that were enforced through
manorial courts and common law (Rodgers et al. 2011). Within this legal framework, the
rules of levancy and couchancy and stinting were practiced, along with the customary law
principle of ‘good neighbourhood’, which provided a reflexive governance regime that is
widely considered to have encouraged sustainable grazing practices (Bailey 2010; Rodgers
2010; Winchester and Straughton 2010; Rodgers et al. 2011; Hodge 2016). In terms of
livestock, there were two specific mechanisms that encouraged sustainable practices. The
first was the rule of levancy and couchancy that required commoners to only graze as many
livestock on the common as could be kept over the winter months. The second was the practice
of stinting, which consisted of grazing rights being defined by a fixed number of animals that
could be adjusted in response to environmental factors.5
However, the Commons Registration Act 1965 required rightsholders to register their
nominal access rights, that could then lawfully be unabatedly enforced regardless of the
environmental conditions. This legislative change led to the discontinuance of the common
5 While stinting consisted of a fixed number of animals it still allowed for flexible and reflexive governance
of the commons. For instance, a fixed number of livestock that could be put on the common based on its
carrying capacity could be established for a given time. Once this total amount was established, it could then
be apportioned amongst rights holders. The Commons Registration Act 1965 destroyed the inherent ability
of stinting to act as a reflexive mechanism to adjust grazing pressures in response to environmental factors
(Rodgers et al. 2011).
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law principles of levancy and couchancy and stinting from being legally binding.6 This often
saw the sum of individual grazing rights being far in excess of the carrying capacity of the
common land, but there was no formal legal mechanism to restrict access to rights holders
as before. Additionally, registration of common rights under the Act led to under-grazing in
parcels of common land where there were now difficulties in investing in communal grazing
infrastructure due to the breakdown of the previous institutional arrangement of managing
common lands (Williams 2006; Natural England 2009b). The Commons Registration Act
1965 can therefore be seen to have effectively severed previous existing links between prin-
ciples of sustainable management and common property rights (Rodgers 2010). While the
UK government aimed to correct for the perverse outcomes generated by the Registration
Act 1965 with the Commons Act 2006,7 in the intervening period (the timeframe which is
the focus of this study), persistent over-grazing in upland commons and under-grazing in
lowland commons were highlighted as a severe threat to biodiversity (Short 2000; Natural
England 2009b).
Following the shock generated by the Registration Act 1965, a number of voluntary
commons associations were established across the country, where members agreed upon
how the common should be managed and how their rules could be enforced.8 Despite their
voluntary nature, there is anecdotal evidence to suggest that they played (and continue to
play) an important role in achieving sustainable land management on the commons where they
operate. For instance, Rodgers et al. (2011) assessment of Eskdale Common (see Fig. 1) is that
the commons association is the main management institution, including in terms of the design
and enforcement of stocking rules that are refined and adapted to accommodate change. They
found that many of the grazing rights follow pre-existing customary practices. In this respect
they found that the commons register is largely irrelevant to graziers when calculating their
use rights on the common, illustrating ‘the secondary role that property law structures have
on environmental management in the case study’ (Rodgers et al. 2011: 102). Like many other
commons in England, Eskdale is party to an agri-environmental agreement, and here they
found that not only did the commons association help negotiate and secure the agreement but
also administer it effectively, including dealing with potential free-rider activity and disputes
among commoners. In addition to the presence of agri-environmental agreements, Eskdale
common is also within the boundaries of a Site of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI) which
places special obligations on landholders to protect the natural environment, which also needs
to be accounted for when evaluating the effectiveness of the commons association.9
While the case of Eskdale common suggests that voluntary commons associations can be
effective tools for sustainable natural resource management, up until now, it is not known
6 Following their registration, rights to commons were no longer inherently reflexive and were incapable
of meeting changing ecological conditions. Additionally, due to registration authorities rarely checking the
rights that were registered, some rights holders were able to inflate or even invent grazing rights for registration
(Rodgers 2010; Rodgers et al. 2011; Hodge 2016).
7 Among other things, the Commons Act 2006 provided for the creation of statutory commons councils with
powers to regulate grazing activities (Short 2008).
8 Some commons associations evolved from manorial institutions, while others were established to collectively
agree on the registration of common rights for the Commons Registration Act 1965 or to negotiate collective
management schemes or management agreements (Rodgers et al. 2011).
9 In addition to SSSI’s, Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONB) and National Parks are designed to
protect the natural environment and have the ability to affect environmental outcomes. In terms of numbers,
57% of the total area of common land is protected areas under the Sites of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI)
designation by Natural England. 48% of the total area of common land is further designated as Areas of
Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONB) and 30% of all common land is located within the boundaries of National
Parks (Rodgers 2010).
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whether this is an isolated case or evidence of a more systematic relationship. Furthermore,
given the regulatory and institutional overlap that often exists within the commons of England,
it is not clear what might be driving the environmental outcomes. If a robust systematic
relationship can be established, it would provide valuable insights to the literature. It would
also provide important insights for policy makers on whether voluntary associations can be
left alone to deliver sustainable grazing outcomes or whether direct regulatory measures are
necessary. Therefore, the remainder of this manuscript is dedicated to assessing whether
voluntary commons associations are capable of achieving sustainable outcomes.
3 Data and Methods
We use historical spatial data on commons and land use outcomes sourced from the Bio-
logical Survey of the common lands in England (Defra 2012) and from the annual Farm
Business Survey (Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food 2010) to investigate whether
management by local commons associations is systematically associated with more sustain-
able grazing outcomes. We use two-stage least squares regression analysis to examine if
commons associations have an effect on more sustainable grazing outcomes using economic
heterogeneity as our instrumental variable.
3.1 Data Sources
3.1.1 The Biological Survey of the Common Lands in England
The biological survey of the common lands in England was compiled over a decade
(1982–1993) by the Rural Surveys Research Unit at Aberystwyth University but only recently
made publicly available. The survey contains extremely valuable biological, geographical,
and regulatory data for 7052 parcels of common land sourced from the registers of com-
mon land, archives and field surveys.10 716 parcels of common land in the biological survey
include field survey evaluations on grazing intensity based primarily on vegetation condition
and quantified according to a six-category classification. A score of 1 or 2 was given to
parcels of common land with low grazing intensity. A score of 3 or 4 was given to parcels
of common land with medium grazing intensity. A score of 5–6 was given to parcels with
high grazing intensity. According to Aitchison et al. (2000), commons judged as having low-
grazing intensity can be considered to be under-grazed and commons judged to have high
intensity can be considered overgrazed. We transform this measure of grazing intensity into
a binary variable with 0 representing either under- or over-grazed intensities and 1 represent-
ing sustainable grazing outcomes. Our rationale for this comes from the poor environmental
outcomes associated with both under-grazing and over-grazing. For example, under-grazing
tends to lead to species invasion and a loss of biodiversity. Similarly, over-grazing tends to
reduce vegetation, expose underlying soil and cause soil erosion (Williams 2006).
10 Owing to the original objective of the survey and the scale of data collection, there are two caveats to using
the dataset. Firstly, the data were designed to provide a broad overview of the situation facing common land
in England. As a result, there is little insight into the intricacies of each parcel of common land (e.g. the exact
nature of the rules enforced by commons associations) and how accurately the number of rights recorded in
the commons registers matched up to the number of rights being exercised in practice. Secondly, the data were
collected at different times over the course of the decade. This means that the dynamics of commons in respect
to responding to both internal and external shocks are not captured in the data (Aitchison and Medcalf 1994;
Aitchison et al. 2000).
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Whether parcels were governed by local commons associations11 were recorded for all
716 parcels of common land with a total of 48 parcels being recorded as governed by voluntary
local commons associations during the survey period. Additional variables of interest in the
survey include: whether or not there were disputes over rights of common among commoners;
the number of grazing rights per hectare; the number of different types of rights12 held;
elevation; dominant habitat and livestock-type; and whether or not the parcel of common
land falls partially or fully within the boundaries of an Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty
(AONB), a Site of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI) or a National Park.
3.1.2 The Farm Business Survey
The farm business survey (FBS) is an annual survey that collects data from approximately
2300 farms in England and Wales. The survey covers the physical, environmental and eco-
nomic performance of farm businesses (Defra 2017). We use spatial data from the farm
business survey over the period 1982–1993 to construct measures of user attributes for
our econometric analysis. Specifically, we construct measures of farmer age, farmer edu-
cation, farm size, farm income, and environmental payments received (see Table 8). We
also calculated our instrumental variable, non-livestock income heterogeneity of farms (eco-
nomic heterogeneity), using data from the Farm Business Survey. To construct our measures,
we first categorized individual farms by the lowest local unit of local administration in
England (LAU1) for the years 1982–1993. For instance, taking our instrumental variable
(economic heterogeneity) as an illustrative example, we calculated the Gini coefficient—a
widely accepted measure of economic inequality—of non-livestock farm income for each
LAU1 polygon over the period 1982–1993. We then averaged Gini coefficients for each
LAU1 polygon over the period 1982–1993 before overlaying all parcels of common land.
We assigned the Gini coefficient for each LAU1 polygon to the parcels of common land
spatially located within respective LAU1 boundaries.13
3.2 Econometric Estimation
We begin by estimating the relationship between the management of local commons and
sustainable grazing outcomes using a linear probability model. While a basic linear proba-
bility model is instructive for determining whether a statistical relationship exists between
voluntary commons associations and sustainable grazing outcomes it has its limitations.
Most importantly, there is likely to be endogeneity between the existence of commons asso-
ciations and environmental outcomes. That is, it may be that better organized and more
11 Commons associations are voluntary groups set up by commoners. These associations rely on members to
determine how the common is managed and usually do not have any legal powers. If members unanimously
agree, commons associations can engage in legally binding agreements, such as the Environmentally Sensitive
Areas (ESA) payment scheme. Based on data from the commons registry, the average commons association
in our sample has 30 rights holders.
12 Rights include the right to pasture, estover, piscary, pannage, turbary and soil.
13 Our approach has three potential limitations. The first limitation is that all farms in the FBS are randomly
displaced by up to 10 km to ensure respondent confidentiality. This means that in a limited number of cases it
is possible that farms will be allocated to an adjacent local administrative unit. A second potential limitation is
that the overlayed farms are not spatially balanced among the 716 parcels of common land. Finally, our third
limitation concerns the difference in the level of scale between parcels of common land and our instrument.
Although we accept that this may lead to a loss in precision, we consider the FBS data and our methodology
to be the most suitable approach to identifying an instrument for commons associations given the available
data.
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community spirited commons may be more likely to form voluntary commons associations.
In such a situation, it becomes difficult to determine whether it is the voluntary commons
associations themselves producing better environmental outcomes or some other underlying
characteristics of the common. In such a case, the linear probability estimation will produce
biased estimates because the variable capturing whether the common is managed by a vol-
untary commons association is likely to be correlated with the error term of the regression.
In response to the potential problem of endogeneity, we employ a two stage least squares
model to estimate a linear relationship between sustainable grazing outcomes and voluntary
commons associations.
3.2.1 Linear Probability Regression Analysis
We estimate the relationship between the management of local commons and sustainable
grazing outcomes using a linear probability model that takes the following form:
gi  α0 + β1Ci + X ′i + εi (1)
where gi is a binary measure for sustainable grazing outcomes for individual common i, Ci
measures whether individual common i has a voluntary commons association in place for
the period of measurement, and X ′i is a vector of control variables.14 We choose a linear
probability model to produce results that are more consistent with the two stage least squares
estimation below. In selecting our control variables, we draw on Ostrom’s (2009) socio-
ecological systems (SES) framework that identifies systems and sub-systems that affect the
likelihood of resource users self-organising to achieve sustainable outcomes. Ostrom’s SES
framework consists of core sub-systems covering users, governance systems and resource
systems and units which interact to produce a range of sustainability outcomes. These core
sub-systems are further disaggregated into second-level variables.
We follow Ostrom’s SES framework in grouping our control variables according to sub-
system.15 Starting with user-attributes, we include the number of users, farmer age, education,
income and farm size. For governance systems, we include whether or not there were disputes
over rights of common among commoners, the number of grazing rights per hectare, the
number of different types of rights held, whether or not the parcel of common land falls
partially or fully within the boundaries of an Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONB),
a Site of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI) or a National Park and average payments from
the environmental sensitive areas (ESA) scheme. For resource systems and units, we include
elevation, dominant habitat type, and livestock type.
3.2.2 Two-Stages Least Squares Regression Analysis
We employ a two stage least squares model to estimate a linear relationship between sus-
tainable grazing outcomes and voluntary commons associations. The first and second-stage
regressions are of the following form:
Ci  α0 + γ1 Zi + X ′i + ui (2)
gi  α0 + β1Ci + X ′i + vi (3)
14 Control variables calculated using data from the Farm Business Survey enter the regression model as the
average value for each individual common i.
15 Our selection of variables is limited to data availability from the Biological Survey of the Common Lands
and the Farm Business Survey.
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In these two equations, gi is the measure for sustainable grazing outcomes, X
′
i is a set of
exogenous control variables (as outlined above), Ci is the endogenous measure for whether
a voluntary commons association in place, Zi is the instrumental variable (economic hetero-
geneity, which is discussed below), and ui and vi are the econometric errors, which contain
unobservable factors that can either be related to the formation of voluntary commons asso-
ciations, sustainable grazing outcomes, or both.
The parameter of interest is the second stage parameter β1, which aims to measure the
causal effect of commons associations on sustainable grazing outcomes. For this parameter to
be identified, the instrument of economic heterogeneity must be both ‘relevant’ and ‘valid’.
Specifically, our instrument must be both correlated with the establishment of commons
associations and have no effect on sustainable grazing outcomes other than through the
establishment of commons associations.
Starting with the ‘relevance’ requirement, theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that
we can expect economic heterogeneity to be associated with the establishment of local com-
mons associations. While it is acknowledged that there is debate over the role that economic
heterogeneity plays in relation to the promotion of community organizations, there seems
little doubt that it is an important factor (e.g. Johnson and Libecap 1982; Tang 1994; Ruttan
and Borgerhoff Mulder 1999; Vedeld 2000; Varughese and Ostrom 2001; Dayton-Johnson
and Bardhan 2002; Kurien and Dietz 2004; Ruttan 2008; Andersson and Agrawal 2011; Ito
2012). In the context of the English commons we posit that economic heterogeneity allows
for some ‘privileged’ commoners to be able to more easily absorb the start-up and running
costs associated with a local commons association, and as will be seen in our results (Table 3),
our measure of economic heterogeneity is strongly positively correlated with local commons
associations.16
Turning to the second requirement of a good instrument, ‘validity’. This requires that
economic heterogeneity should exclusively affect sustainable grazing outcomes through its
first stage impact on the establishment of commons associations. We consider this to be a
defendable assumption in our case, as it is not apparent how economic heterogeneity (as
we measure it—see below) could play a role in sustainable grazing outcomes, other than
through better community organization that is manifested by the establishment of a commons
association. While it is true that income levels may affect environmental preferences or
capacity to undertake investments that protect the environment, there is no apparent reason
why economic heterogeneity should. Given that economic heterogeneity may be linked to
concentration of common use rights that may in turn be linked to grazing outcomes, we
construct a measure that de-links this potential relationship.17 We do this by excluding
income derived from livestock in our measure of farm income that is used to construct
our measure of economic heterogeneity. By excluding all income generated from livestock
(whether on private or common land) we hope to exclude the potential for a direct relationship
between income heterogeneity and management of common land, thus providing us with an
16 In theory, a counter-argument could be made that commoners are less likely to engage in the establishment
of commons associations (or engage for symbolic reasons only) since their economic situation does not depend
heavily on the environmental quality of the common.
17 For example, if we take the extreme case where one commoner owns all the access rights to a given parcel
of land this would be akin to private property rights for that parcel and is therefore likely to result in a different
level of grazing intensity than if grazing rights were dispersed evenly among a group of farmers.
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instrument that should be valid.18 As an additional check, we estimate an overidentified model
using generalized method of moments (gmm) estimation. To do this, we disaggregate our
economic heterogeneity variable into two components: crop income and off-farm income. We
calculate the gini coefficient for each component and include the two measures of economic
heterogeneity as our instruments. This allows for us to test the validity of our instruments
using the Hansen J-statistic test.
4 Results
4.1 Summary Statistics
Table 1 reports summary statistics for our measures of sustainable grazing and local commons
associations, as well as our user-, governance-, and resource-attribute variables. Summary
statistics are also presented for our instrumental variable: economic heterogeneity. In our
sample, we find that 331 (46%) of our parcels of common land are grazed sustainably and
that 385 parcels are either under- or over-grazed. We also see that 48 parcels of common land
are managed by a commons association.
4.2 Linear Probability Model
As can be seen in Table 2, commons associations are consistently linked with sustainable
grazing outcomes at the 1 percent significance level across all estimation specifications using
OLS. The coefficient is also highly consistent across specifications. Beginning with our
first specification which includes no control variables (column 1) we find that commons
associations are 36 percentage points more likely to be associated with sustainable grazing
outcomes. When we include user attributes in our model (column 2), we continue to find
commons associations to be statistically significant at the 1% level and commons associations
are 39 percentage points more likely to be associated with sustainable grazing outcomes.
In column 3 we control for governance attributes and find that commons associations are
now 33 percentage points more likely to be associated with sustainable grazing outcomes.
Controlling only for resource attributes (column 4), we find that commons associations are
36 percentage points more likely to be associated with sustainable grazing outcomes. In our
preferred specification (column 5), we include all user-, governance- and resource-attribute
control variables and find that commons associations are 36 percentage points more likely to
be associated with sustainable grazing outcomes.19
4.3 Instrumental Variable Estimation
While the estimations above suggest a strong link between sustainable grazing and commons
associations, they do not establish a causal relationship due to the potential for endogeneity.
As discussed above, more cohesive and functional commons communities may be more prone
18 Our instrumental variable is the heterogeneity of farm-income excluding income derived from livestock.
We exclude income derived from livestock to de-link our instrumental variable from livestock income hetero-
geneity, which may be directly related to sustainable grazing outcomes. We consider our instrumental variable
to be de-linked from livestock income heterogeneity as the correlation coefficient of our instrumental variable
with livestock income heterogeneity is 0.186 and the correlation coefficient between our instrumental variable
and total farm income heterogeneity (including income from livestock) is 0.564, respectively.
19 We note that estimations using a logistic regression model produce similar results to our OLS estimates
(see Table 8).
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Table 1 Summary statistics
Variable N N = 1 Mean SD Min. Max.
Sustainable grazing 716 331 0.462 0.499 0 1
Overgrazing 716 195 0.272 0.445 0 1
Commons association 716 48 0.067 0.230 0 1
Economic heterogeneity 573 – 0.416 0.089 0.086 0.705
Economic heterogeneity
(crop income)
497 – 0.527 0.143 0.29 0.841
Economic heterogeneity
(off-farm income)
573 – 0.573 0.114 0.146 0.810
User attributes
Age 618 – 49.471 4.183 48.278 51.546
Education (log) 618 – 2.519 0.076 2.485 2.565
Farm size (log) 618 – 4.772 0.643 4.477 5.216
Income (log) 618 – 10.220 0.485 10.043 10.531
Governance attributes
Grazing rights per hectare 716 – 0.585 2.116 0 31.532
Rights disputes 716 183 0.256 0.437 0 1
Types of rights 716 – 1.824 1.565 0 7
AONB/SSSI/National Park 716 366 0.511 0.500 1 1
ESA payment (log) 618 – 8.597 0.757 8.025 9.173
Resource attributes
Elevation 716 – 1.940 1.480 0.02 6.10
Dominant livestock 716 446 0.623 0.485 0 1
Dominant habitat 716 451 0.630 0.483 0 1
Minimum and maximum values are replaced by the 25th and 75th percentile values for all variables (economic
heterogeneity, age, education, farm size, income, ESA payment) constructed using data from the Farm Business
Survey in accordance with Defra data privacy conditions. Age and education are measured in years. Farm size
is measured in hectares. Income and ESA payments are measured in British pounds. Elevation is measured in
100 s of metres
Table 2 Linear probability regression results
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Commons association 0.358***
(0.066)
0.385***
(0.064)
0.325***
(0.066)
0.357***
(0.066)
0.355***
(0.067)
User attributes No Yes No No Yes
Governance attributes No No Yes No Yes
Resource attributes No No No Yes Yes
N 716 611 675 716 611
The dependent variable is a binary measure where a value of 0 denotes either under- or over-grazing or a
value of 1 denotes medium intensity grazing. User attributes include age, education, farm size, and income.
Governance attributes include grazing rights per hectare, types of rights, rights disputes, AONB/SSSI/National
Park and ESA payments. Resource attributes include elevation, dominant habitat and dominant livestock
***, ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. Robust standard
errors are presented in parentheses
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Table 3 Main results: two-stage least squares
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: second stage
Commons association 0.573**
(0.285)
0.940***
(0.359)
0.515*
(0.304)
0.611**
(0.281)
0.843**
(0.351)
Panel B: first stage
Economic heterogeneity 0.780***
(0.152)
0.717***
(0.156)
0.740***
(0.141)
0.796***
(0.154)
0.714***
(0.148)
User attributes No Yes No No Yes
Governance attributes No No Yes No Yes
Resource attributes No No No Yes Yes
AP/KP F Stat 26.380 21.156 27.394 26.782 22.488
N 573 565 573 573 565
The dependent variable is a binary measure where a value of 0 denotes either under- or over-grazing or a
value of 1 denotes medium intensity grazing. User attributes include age, education, farm size, and income.
Governance attributes include grazing rights per hectare, types of rights, rights disputes, AONB/SSSI/National
Park and ESA payments. Resource attributes include elevation, dominant habitat and dominant livestock
***, ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. Robust standard
errors are presented in parentheses
to form commons associations. Therefore, we instrument for commons associations using a
measure of economic heterogeneity (excluding livestock income).
Table 3 presents the results of an exactly identified two-stage least squares regression
that mirrors the simple OLS regressions above; where in column 1 we do not include any
control variables, in column 2 we include only our user-attribute variables, in column 3 we
include only our governance-attribute variables, in column 4 we include only our resource-
attribute variables, and in column 5 we include user-, governance- and resource-attributes. In
terms of our first stage results it can be seen that our measure of economic heterogeneity is
positively associated with commons associations across all specifications at the 1% statistical
significance level. Indeed, the Angrist–Pischke (AP) F statistic has a value above 21 across
each of the specifications suggesting that economic heterogeneity is an informative instrument
(Staiger and Stocks 1997; Stock and Yogo 2005).
In terms of the second stage, we find commons associations to be positively associated with
sustainable grazing outcomes across all specifications, with generally higher coefficients but
with lower significance levels compared to our OLS regression results.20 The fall in statistical
significance is a result of much larger standard errors compared to the simple OLS regressions
(approximately 5 times larger). This is to be expected with two-stage least squares regres-
sions, as only part of the variation in commons management is used to explain sustainable
management outcomes. In our preferred specification, which includes user-, governance- and
20 The higher coefficient could be due to correcting for endogeneity contained within the OLS and/or the fact
that the OLS and 2SLS estimate different effects. OLS estimates an average treatment effect (ATE), whereas
the 2SLS estimates a local average treatment effect (LATE). The LATE is the effect of voluntary commons
associations on sustainable grazing outcomes for those observations that were shifted by our instrument (non-
farm income heterogeneity). This means that it is not an estimate for the entire sample, but only for a subset
of observations (the set of ‘compliers’). In particular, our IV estimates do not apply to those commons that
would have adopted voluntary commons associations no matter what the value of the instrument was (the
set of ‘always-takers’), nor does it apply to those commons who would have never established a voluntary
commons association no matter what the value of the instrument was (the set of ‘never-takers’).
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resource-attributes as controls, we find commons associations to be positively associated with
sustainable grazing outcomes at the 5% level with a coefficient of 0.843. That is, our results
find that commons that have commons associations are approximately 84 percentage points
more likely to produce sustainable grazing outcomes. Importantly, this result stands while
controlling for individual characteristics of farmers that use the commons, wider governance
characteristics (including regulatory overlap such as commons being in national parks) and
geographical and biological attributes of the commons themselves (including elevation).
5 Robustness
Our estimates above show that commons governed by voluntary commons associations are
much more likely to achieve sustainable grazing outcomes. However, it is acknowledged
that these results depend on our measure economic heterogeneity being a valid instrument.
They also depend on our operationalisation of ‘sustainable grazing’. In this section we aim
to demonstrate the robustness of our results. Firstly, we overidentify the estimated model
by disaggregating our measure of economic heterogeneity into two separate instruments.
Secondly, we estimate the relationship between voluntary commons associations and under-
grazing and over-grazing using a multinomial logit regression. Thirdly, we estimate the
relationship between voluntary commons associations and over-grazing only. Finally, we
control for time stamps to take into account the fact that the data on sustainable grazing were
collected over the course of a decade.
5.1 Overidentified Model
In an effort to test whether our instrument can be legitimately excluded from our estimated
equation, we estimate an overidentified model using generalized method of moments (gmm)
estimation. This allows for us to test the validity of our instrument (economic heterogeneity)
using the Hansen J-statistic test. The Hansen J-statistic test is a heteroscedasticity robust joint
null hypothesis test that the instruments are valid (e.g. uncorrelated with the error term). To do
this, we disaggregate our economic heterogeneity variable into two components: crop income
and off-farm income. We calculate the gini coefficient for each component and include the two
measures of economic heterogeneity as our instruments. As shown in Table 4, we continue
to find both measures of economic heterogeneity to be positively associated with commons
associations across all specifications at the 1% significance level. We also continue to find
commons associations to be positively associated with sustainable grazing outcomes at the
5% significance level. Turning to our results for Hansen’s J test statistic, we find p values of
0.454–0.603 across all of our specifications. We therefore do not reject the null hypothesis
that our instruments are valid.
5.2 Multinomial Logit Regression
As previously mentioned, in our main analysis we transformed the six-category measure
of grazing intensity into a binary measure denoting sustainable grazing and unsustainable
grazing (under- and over-grazing). As an additional robustness test, we make use of a more
comprehensive distribution of our measure of sustainable grazing and investigate the statis-
tical relationship between voluntary commons associations and grazing outcomes using a
multinomial logistic regression. To do this, we collapse the six-category measure of grazing
intensity into three categories: under-grazing (categories 1 and 2), sustainable grazing (cate-
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Table 4 Overidentified gmm regression results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: second stage
Commons association 0.527**
(0.222)
0.717**
(0.281)
0.492**
(0.249)
0.581**
(0.239)
0.632**
(0.294)
Panel B: first stage
Economic heterogeneity
(crop income)
0.481***
(0.091)
0.486***
(0.090)
0.449***
(0.088)
0.457***
(0.097)
0.451***
(0.096)
Economic heterogeneity
(off-farm income)
0.344***
(0.116)
0.297***
(0.101)
0.292***
(0.108)
0.343***
(0.117)
0.298***
(0.108)
User attributes No Yes No No Yes
Governance attributes No No Yes No Yes
Resource attributes No No No Yes Yes
AP/KP F statistic 14.574 14.769 14.375 12.191 11.842
Minimum eigenvalue
statistic
32.487 22.586 25.415 27.663 19.145
Hansen’s J test statistic (p
value)
0.454 0.541 0.552 0.510 0.603
N 494 492 494 494 492
The dependent variable is a binary measure where a value of 0 denotes either under- or over-grazing or a
value of 1 denotes medium intensity grazing. User attributes include age, education, farm size, and income.
Governance attributes include grazing rights per hectare, types of rights, rights disputes, AONB/SSSI/National
Park and ESA payments. Resource attributes include elevation, dominant habitat and dominant livestock
***, ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. Robust standard
errors are presented in parentheses
gories 3 and 4), and over-grazing (categories 5 and 6). We do this for two reasons. Firstly, we
require a base category of sustainable grazing for comparison. Secondly, not all categories
had sufficient observations to be included individually.
Our results are presented in Table 5. We find that voluntary commons associations are
associated with a decreased probability of there being over-grazing relative to sustainable
grazing at the 5% significance level. We also find that commons associations are associated
with a decreased probability of there being under-grazing relative to sustainable grazing
at the 10% significance level. These results are robust to including user-, governance- and
resource-attribute control variables and robust standard errors. Our results are consistent with
our OLS and logistic regression estimations that use a binary variable of sustainable grazing.
5.3 Overgrazing
As discussed above, under-grazing imposes a threat to sustainable grazing practices for
the commons of England and is therefore included in our measure for sustainable grazing
outcomes in our main results. Under-grazing can lead to species infestation and is explicitly
recognised as a threat to sustainable farming practices by a number of commons associations.
One of the main causes for under-grazing is a lack of grazing infrastructure. For example,
a report commissioned by Natural England (2009a) found that individual commoners in
Exmoor were unwilling to graze some parcels of common land due to a lack of cattle grids,
and that more generally a lack of fencing was a significant deterrent to individual commoners
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exercising their grazing rights. Investing in infrastructure (e.g. cattle grids, fences) can be
often prohibitively costly for a given individual but could be an optimal strategy for the group
as a whole.
Despite this, we acknowledge that over-grazing is most usually associated with the unsus-
tainable management of commons, as popularized by Hardin’s (1968) classic allegory.
Therefore, we estimate the relationship between commons associations and overgrazing
using the same exactly identified two-stage least squares approach as in our main results. As
can be seen in Table 6, we find a negative and highly significant relationship. These results
show that commons governed by voluntary commons associations are less likely to result in
over-grazing. In our preferred specification, that includes all controls relating to user, gov-
ernance and resource attributes, commons governed by voluntary commons associations are
94 percentage points less likely to result in over-grazing.
5.4 Time-Stamps
As previously noted, our grazing intensity data were collected over a decade. To make sure that
the period in time at which data were collected for a given parcel does not systematically affect
our results, we re-run our exactly identified two-stage least squares regression estimations
controlling for time-stamps denoting when the grazing intensity data were collected from
each parcel. As can be seen in Table 7, our results continue to be statistically significant at
the 1 and 5% significance levels when controlling for time-stamps.
6 Discussion
Using two-stage least squares regression analysis we have found that commons governed
by voluntary commons associations are approximately 84 percentage points more likely to
produce sustainable grazing outcomes than those that are not. These results hold while con-
trolling for the individual characteristics of farmers that use the commons, wider governance
characteristics (including regulatory overlap such as commons being in national parks) and
geographical and biological attributes of the commons themselves.
Table 5 Multinomial logistic regression results—average marginal effects
Variables Undergrazing Overgrazing
Commons association − 0.179*
(0.102)
− 0.214**
(0.092)
User attributes Yes Yes
Governance attributes Yes Yes
Resource attributes Yes Yes
Log likelihood =− 664.515
N = 611
The dependent variable is a categorical measure where the base category is medium-intensity grazing. User
attributes include age, education, farm size, and income. Governance attributes include grazing rights per
hectare, types of rights, rights disputes, AONB/SSSI/National Park and ESA payments. Resource attributes
include elevation, dominant habitat and dominant livestock
***, ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. Robust standard
errors are presented in parentheses
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Table 6 Two-stage least squares results—overgrazing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: second stage
Commons association − 0.948***
(0.291)
− 0.967***
(0.316)
− 0.972***
(0.328)
− 0.886***
(0.276)
− 0.937***
(0.354)
Panel B: first stage
Economic heterogeneity 0.780***
(0.152)
0.722***
(0.153)
0.710***
(0.140)
0.796***
(0.154)
0.648***
(0.138)
User attributes No Yes No No Yes
Governance attributes No No Yes No Yes
Resource attributes No No No Yes Yes
AP/KP F Stat 26.379 22.425 25.771 26.782 22.173
N 573 565 573 573 565
The dependent variable is a binary measure where a value of 0 denotes either under- or medium-grazing or
a value of 1 denotes overgrazing. User attributes include age, education, farm size, and income. Governance
attributes include grazing rights per hectare, types of rights, rights disputes, AONB/SSSI/National Park and
ESA payments. Resource attributes include elevation, dominant habitat and dominant livestock
***, ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. Robust standard
errors are presented in parentheses
Table 7 Two-stage least squares controlling for time stamps
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: second stage
Commons association 0.652**
(0.274)
0.970***
(0.350)
0.599**
(0.303)
0.667**
(0.278)
0.837**
(0.372)
Panel B: first stage
Economic heterogeneity 0.890***
(0.005)
0.810***
(0.177)
0.821***
(0.156)
0.878***
(0.008)
0.752***
(0.166)
User attributes No Yes No No Yes
Governance attributes No No Yes No Yes
Resource attributes No No No Yes Yes
Time stamps Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
AP/KP F Stat 27.298 20.966 27.790 26.673 20.590
N 514 506 514 514 506
The dependent variable is a binary measure where a value of 0 denotes either under- or over-grazing or a
value of 1 denotes medium intensity grazing. User attributes include age, education, farm size, and income.
Governance attributes include grazing rights per hectare, types of rights, rights disputes, AONB/SSSI/National
Park and ESA payments. Resource attributes include elevation, dominant habitat and dominant livestock. Time
stamps denote the year when grazing intensity data were recorded through a field survey
***, ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. Robust standard
errors are presented in parentheses
The policy shock generated by the Commons Registration Act 1965 provided us with an
opportunity to test whether the voluntary commons associations that evolved as a result of
the shock were able to achieve sustainable environmental outcomes. Our findings therefore
make a quantitative contribution directly to both the literature evaluating the effectiveness
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of voluntary associations and agreements to deliver improved environmental outcomes and
to the largely case-study-based commons literature. As noted by Kotchen (2013), the results
on the efficacy of voluntary approaches to environmental management have been mixed to
date and the literature suffers from empirical difficulties, most notably poor measurement
and selection biases. We have been able to deal with the measurement issue by using the
recently released Biological Survey of the Common Lands of England that provided detailed
and scientific assessment of grazing outcomes on a sample of commons. In relation to the
potential for selection bias, we use an instrumental variable approach. We consider that these
approaches in tandem enable us to deal with the main empirical problems and to make a
claim that voluntary commons associations lead to more sustainable grazing practices.
Our study complements the rich detail of case studies of voluntary commons associations
and sustainable natural resource management. For example, the previously mentioned case
study of Eskdale Common by Rodgers et al. (2011) sheds light on both the place- and time-
specific processes resulting in the formation of the Eskdale voluntary commons association
and on the role that its voluntary commons association played in improving the sustainability
of grazing practices. Although such case study approaches are incredibly important and
necessary in order to improve our understanding of the commons and their management, they
do not allow for hypothesis testing and are limited in their external validity (van Laerhoven
2010). By using a unique dataset of 716 parcels of common land in England, our study allows
for the scaling-up of local-level findings such as that of Eskdale Common by testing the
hypothesis that voluntary commons associations lead to more sustainable grazing outcomes
at the national-level.
While voluntary commons associations were found to markedly improve environmental
sustainability outcomes, it is also noteworthy that the majority of commons in our sample
do not have them.21 These results taken together suggest that while voluntary environmen-
tal associations can be effective when they exist, they are relatively rare. In terms of policy
implications, this suggests that direct government action may still be necessary if widespread
environmental improvements are to be achieved. However, governments should proceed cau-
tiously as there is a growing body of experimental literature on common resource management
(see Lopez et al. 2012; Santis and Chávez 2015; Velez et al. 2010; Vollan 2008; Cardenas and
Stranlund 2000) that highlights the potential crowding-out effects of government intervention
on intrinsic motivation to govern commons. Furthermore, the work of Dal Bó et al. (2010)
has shown that exogenously imposed governance regimes can be far less effective than those
developed endogenously through democratic processes.
As an alternative to direct government regulation, governments could aim to foster the
establishment of voluntary environmental associations more widely. This would involve a
thorough understanding of the structural impediments to the formation of voluntary associa-
tions. In the English context, some of the key impediments to the establishment of voluntary
commons associations appear to be (relatively) high establishment and running costs. This is
as establishing voluntary commons associations can be particularly complex and time con-
suming because of the need to secure the participation of all rights holders, whether they
are active users or not: a problem that is made even more complex when rights registered
under the 1965 Act have been subsequently sold with no requirement to inform the register
of the new rights holder. Other impediments to collective management include the reluctance
21 We empirically investigated if there were any spillovers from parcels with voluntary commons associations
to neighbouring parcels with respect to both the likelihood of voluntary commons associations being built and
to grazing intensity using ordinary least squares and logistic estimation techniques. We were unable to find
statistically significant evidence of spillovers.
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of some inactive graziers to allow new binding rules that they feared might prevent their
dormant rights from being exercised at a later date (Rodgers et al. 2011).
It is hoped that some of the impediments to the formation of voluntary commons associ-
ations identified above will be addressed through the ongoing implementation of the 2006
Commons Act, in particular through the opportunity for commoners to establish Commons
Councils without the need for unanimous agreement of all rights holders. Importantly this
reform should reduce establishment costs by lowering search and negotiation costs (as not
every single rights holder needs to be contacted and convinced to join the association for it
to have binding rules), however it may increase them in other areas.22
It is worth noting that while we have aimed to deal with endogeneity through the use
of an instrumental variable approach, there may be unobservable characteristics among the
members of the current voluntary commons associations that differ from those who are
not, and this has the potential to bias our results. For instance, Dal Bó et al. (2010) found
that those more likely to vote for voluntary governance mechanisms are more likely to
act cooperatively in an experimental setting, while Rustagi et al. (2010) has shown that
groups with a higher share of conditional cooperators are more likely to have better forest
outcomes. These studies suggest there may well be unobservable characteristics that link
voluntary commons associations to sustainable grazing outcomes that we have been unable
to control for. Nonetheless, we consider that we have provided some useful evidence linking
voluntary commons associations to better environmental outcomes. As outlined earlier, we
note that the existing literature is mixed on this issue.23 Ultimately, we hope that our results
help researchers and policy makers find the best institutional arrangements to govern the
commons.
When assessing our results in terms of their broader applicability, some discussion of the
institutional environment that the commons associations are situated within is also necessary.
While it is true that the Commons Registration Act 1965 led to a ‘direct’ institutional vac-
uum in relation to commons management, other governance measures were instituted, and the
broader institutional structure of English law remained in place. In terms of the establishment
of commons associations, while the government did not incentivise their formation through
the threat of intervention if a voluntary agreement could not be reached (indeed the opposite
occurred in that they were a response to the withdrawal of a government regulatory frame-
work), it did incentivise their incorporation through the establishment of agri-environmental
schemes. These schemes provided funds to farmers for delivering sustainable farming out-
comes and were only accessible to common rights holders when they coordinated themselves.
In this sense the government provided a ‘carrot’ for voluntary associations rather than a ‘stick’
(as proposed by Mansbridge 2014).
The second important institutional factor relates to the English legal system as a whole.
Commons associations are unincorporated bodies that do not have the legal power to bind a
dissenting minority and they are only able to make a binding agreement to regulate livestock
through unanimous participation amongst rights holders (Rodgers et al. 2011). However, if
22 The 2006 Commons Act may increase establishment costs in given that Commons Councils are statutory
bodies with formal procedural requirements. There have been two Commons Councils established under the
Commons Act 2006: Bodmin Moor Commons Council established in 2015 (Statutory Instrument 2015 No.
1515); and Brendon Commons Council established in 2013 (Statutory Instrument 2013 No. 2959). Defra are
currently in discussions about a possible council in Cumbria and Northumberland (personal communication
3 January 2018).
23 In addition to the literature cited above, it should also be noted that the literature analysing voluntary
international environmental agreements governing regional and global commons suggests they are merely
ratifying business-as-usual outcomes (see Kellenberg and Levinson 2014).
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consensus to form an association can be achieved, the members of the commons associations
can enter into a legally binding agreement that enables non-compliers and defectors to be
punished through the courts. Therefore, while the voluntary commons associations were
unable to sanction non-compliers directly (other than through the use of social sanctions)
they could use legal action (or threat of it) to enforce their rules. This highlights the potential
importance of a well-functioning legal system in providing an ‘institutional infrastructure’
that enables voluntary environmental associations to continue to be effective in delivering
environmental benefits once an agreement has been made.
7 Conclusion
The 1965 Commons Registration Act was a policy shock that led to the removal of the
capacity of commoners to regulate the intensity of grazing via traditional legal means. In
response to this shock a number of voluntary commons associations were formed. Using
spatial environmental and socio-economic data, we investigate whether these voluntary com-
mons associations were able to deliver improved environmental sustainability outcomes.
Using an instrumental variable approach, we find that commons governed by voluntary asso-
ciations were approximately 84 percentage points more likely to produce sustainable grazing
outcomes. These results are robust to the existence of a variety of controls, including the exis-
tence of overlapping institutional frameworks. Our results make an important quantitative
contribution to the literature evaluating the effectiveness of voluntary associations and agree-
ments to deliver improved environmental outcomes. At the same time, our results complement
the rich detail of case studies found in the commons literature by testing the hypothesis that
voluntary commons associations are causally related to more sustainable grazing outcomes
at the national-level. In terms of policy implications our results are more mixed. This is as
while our results show that voluntary associations can deliver more environmentally sustain-
able outcomes, voluntary associations themselves are relatively rare. This suggests that either
direct government regulation is necessary (with the risk of crowding out current informal
practices and intrinsic motivation) or governments must be more proactive in encouraging
the formation and operation of voluntary commons associations by lowering establishment
and running costs.
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Appendix
Tables 8 and 9.
Table 8 Logistic regression results—average marginal effects
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Commons
association
0.391***
(0.094)
0.427***
(0.095)
0.359***
(0.091)
0.391***
(0.093)
0.396***
(0.093)
User attributes No Yes No No Yes
Governance
attributes
No No Yes No Yes
Resource
attributes
No No No Yes Yes
Log-likelihood − 484.074 − 408.106 − 446.981 − 483.429 − 396.948
N 716 611 675 716 611
The dependent variable is a binary measure where a value of 0 denotes either under- or over-grazing or a
value of 1 denotes medium intensity grazing. User attributes include age, education, farm size, and income.
Governance attributes include grazing rights per hectare, types of rights, rights disputes, AONB/SSSI/National
Park and ESA payments. Resource attributes include elevation, dominant habitat and dominant livestock
***, ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. Robust standard
errors are presented in parentheses
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